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Focus Article
Climate change and International
River Boundaries: ﬁxed points
in shifting sands
Sam Grainger1,2∗ and Declan Conway3
The impacts of climate changewill have far reaching consequences for transbound-
ary water resources, particularly through the effects of changing frequency and
intensity of extreme events, such as ﬂoods and their impacts on river channel sys-
tems. Watercourses have been used as boundaries throughout history for a variety
of reasons, and as both a natural resource and political structure, they present a
number of unique challenges. Despite academic studies looking broadly at the
effects of changes in runoff on river ecosystems and their resources, less atten-
tion has been paid to the socio-political interactions and consequences for river
functionality, in particular, as a boundary. We review the historical and legal role
of International River Boundaries highlighting the paradox that exists between the
stability needed for a boundary and the dynamism of ﬂuvial landscapes in a chang-
ing climate. We draw attention to the fact that geopolitical concerns exist at other
unstable border situations, such as ice-covered boundaries and lakes. We examine
the knowledge gaps that exist in relation to understanding the physical impacts of
climate change on terrestrial earth systems. We present an exploratory analysis of
physical and political risk in Southern Africa that highlights two cases of potential
risk. The paper ends with a discussion of actions to address the physical and social
dimensions of this strategic issue. © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Clim Change 2014, 5:835–848. doi: 10.1002/wcc.306
INTRODUCTION
Climate plays an important role in the evolutionof river channel systems within terrestrial earth
surface systems.1 There is general agreement that cur-
rent climatic conditions are subject to human inter-
ference through our emissions of greenhouse gasses,
and that even immediate mitigation will not halt
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continued global impacts. Warmer temperatures will
allow the atmosphere to hold more moisture, affecting
evaporation and humidity, and leading to higher
precipitation intensities.2 Observed global precipita-
tion displays an anthropogenic climate change signal3
and increasing flood risk during autumn in England
and Wales has been associated with greenhouse gas
emissions,4 as has observed intensification of daily and
five daily precipitation amounts during the second half
of the last century.5
By the end of this century, we are likely to see
substantial shifts in mean annual streamflow, water
availability, and flood risk in some regions, as a result
of climate change.6,7 Floods play a major role as
drivers of channel and floodplain structures and asso-
ciated riparian and in-stream ecosystems.8 Changes
in high intensity precipitation in many regions of the
world will alter flow regimes and floods, influencing
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channel development.9,10 Indeed, the major floods
on the Indus in July 2010 appear to have altered
the river’s course in Pakistan, moving it closer to
the Indian district of Kutch.11 Limited attention
has been paid, however, to the ways in which these
changes in the natural system may interact with the
numerous socioeconomic and political functions and
structures imposed on rivers by human civilization.12
One of the ways human society has utilized
watercoursesa has been through the delimitation of
international boundaries. Historically, decisions to
attach boundaries to rivers have been motivated by
a number of national concerns. The exact location
of the line along the boundary river is not always
agreed upon,13 and therefore defining and agreeing
on how the line relates to the watercourse, even when
demarcated within a treaty, is often open to interpre-
tation. Rivers are dynamic systems and the natural
variability of fluvial processes has historically led to a
number of riparian responses and disputes, and with
continuing human modification of the environment
the resilience of political structures is uncertain.14
These natural landforms serve as catalysts to connect,
but also separate people, cultures, and communities.13
The extent and management implications of
watercourse boundaries around the world have
received limited attention.15 The International River
Boundaries Database (IRBD) calculates that well over
one third of the total length of international borders
follow watercourses.16 They span the globe; from a
few meters of the Zambezi River between Namibia
and Zimbabwe to thousands of kilometers of the Rio
Grande between Mexico and the United States.16,17
There is no mention of the relationship between the
impact of climate change on fluvial morphology and
the consequences for International River Bound-
aries (IRBs) in reviews by the IPCC.18 The Human
Development Report in 2011 makes reference to
conflict as a possible effect of environmental change
but fails to acknowledge IRBs as potential sources
of conflict.19 Academic studies have considered the
effects of climate change-induced changes in runoff
on river ecosystems and their resources,6,20 however,
less attention has been paid to the socio-political
interactions and consequences of these biophysical
changes on the functionality of rivers as boundaries.
Moreover, literature which deals specifically with the
management of transboundary or international water
resources, and the drivers of conflict and cooperation
in such river basins, rarely distinguishes between the
geographical configurations of watercourses, and
fails to consider the implications of climate change
on fluvial processes and morphology, and indirectly,
corresponding boundaries.21–23
While our focus is watercourses as international
borders, they also form subnational borders between
administrative areas such as states and provinces
(e.g., United States and India), and there are other
situations where political boundaries are located in
dynamic environments. The potential disappearance
of Small Island States due to sea level rise has been
highlighted,24–26 however, the following examples
have received much less attention and most infor-
mation lies outside the peer-reviewed literature.
Numerous international boundaries dissect large bod-
ies of water including Lake Malawi (that experienced
a recent dispute over oil/gas exploitation), Lakes
Chad, Ontario, Superior, Titicaca, and the Caspian
Sea. Ice-covered boundaries exist in the Alps, where
glaciers between Switzerland and Italy have drifted in
recent decades forcing both countries to redefine parts
of the borders, with relatively minor consequences.
At the local scale, borders may have much greater
significance for communities than at state level.27
Austria has recently considered the idea of a movable
border, where experts from affected parties would be
responsible for altering it, until the glaciers disappear
completely.28 Alternatively, in areas where borders
are contested, melting glaciers could provoke greater
controversy, for example, along disputed sections of
India’s borders with China and Pakistan, and the
long-running dispute between Chile and Argentina
over sovereignty of their boundary ice fields.29 Warm-
ing in the Arctic Circle, opening up newly navigable
waters and increasing access, is driving Russia, Nor-
way, Canada, United States, and Denmark to secure
and exploit shipping routes, oilfields, and mineral
deposits.24,29 Geophysical change also has a role in
maritime border disputes such as the Ganges Delta,
involving India and Bangladesh, which is vulnerable
to the vast flux in the seasonal flooding cycle, river and
cyclone associated floods, and processes of sedimenta-
tion and erosion.30 Paradoxically, boundaries located
in dynamic physical environments lack the requisite
stability required for these political constructs.
Here we draw attention to the potential signif-
icance of climate change for watercourses that serve
as international boundaries. First, we review their
history and function and then examine the relation-
ship between climate and river channel morphology
under current and future conditions. As a preliminary
assessment of this issue, we present an exploratory
analysis of physical and political risk in Southern
Africa, a region that exemplifies the interaction of
climate change, streamflow sensitivity, and complex
river boundaries. Finally, we propose actions to
address the physical and social dimensions of this
under-recognized issue.
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INTERNATIONAL RIVER BOUNDARIES
In the past, decisions to enlist watercourses as bound-
aries have been motivated by a plethora of national
concerns including military, strategic, economic, and
even practical. In the majority of cases, IRBs are
historical relics constructed with little consideration
for either physical or political geography. Rivers were
originally adopted in boundary making as a conve-
nient, cost-effective, and recognizable landmark to
separate one empire from another and to avoid terri-
torial confrontation.31 There are regions around the
world where dramatic differences in the prevalence
of IRBs can be observed. For example, in South and
South East Asia, there is a notably low prevalence
of IRBs and the deep valleys and white-water of
the middle Mekong (Thailand/Laos) may be consid-
ered the only significant (majority of total boundary
length) river boundary in this vast region.32 This
is in stark contrast with East Asia where 98% of
the China–North Korea border is aligned with the
Tumen and Yalu rivers, while large sections of the
Russia–China border runs along the Amur and Argun
Rivers.33
Whatever the reason was for choosing a river
as a boundary, it is clear that such a dynamic phys-
ical feature is likely to present significant problems
both in defining the boundary and sharing the water
resource. To date river boundaries have never caused
a major international military conflict, however, they
carry the potential to provoke diplomatic disputes.16
Recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
arbitrated two cases relating to the San Juan River
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica as a result of
requests submitted by both nations for the indica-
tion of new provisional measures. Ultimately, the
ICJ did not deem it necessary to exercise its powers
on behalf of Nicaragua, but found that Nicaragua
should refrain from dredging and other activities in
disputed territory.34,35 Despite their use as territorial
frontiers, it could potentially be the water resources
or hydropower potential contained within these rivers
that are the primary focus of any conflict of interest.36
As a result, the role of IRBs in defining access to
valuable natural resources influences international
relations and can make allocation problematic.37
Although dozens of configurations can be iden-
tified, the two pure types of international river are
‘through-border’ (successive; the watercourse flows
from one country to another) and ‘border-creator’
(contiguous; the river runs along an international
boundary without crossing it).38 Conflict analyzes
tend to focus on the former, perhaps assuming that
border-creator configurations discourage resource
sabotage, as aggressive actions in this case are
mutually detrimental.38 However, early work on the
subject discourages such dismissive approaches.39 In
addition, legal doctrine has sought to examine both
‘contiguous’ and ‘successive’ rivers, and at times has
even argued that different rules should apply to each
category.40
To hold credibility, a boundary line must be sta-
ble, yet river boundaries are natural phenomena that
undergo constant change even during average stream-
flow. Such changes may be the result of natural and/or
human-induced fluvial processes, leading to accretion
(gradual lateral movement) or avulsion (rapid lateral
movement) of a channel.37 In extreme cases of the
latter, sudden changes in runoff can shift the course
of a river to create a completely new channel. Despite
the widespread awareness of these changes, boundary
treaties make little distinction between different levels
of change, and as a result diplomatic responses have
varied.41
State responses to the demarcation of IRBs
are complex; despite the inevitable influence of such
legal terms as accretion and avulsion, neighboring
states have considerable discretion in resolving any
border dispute. While cooperation over international
watercourses seems to be partially influenced by
legal rights, geographical configuration and climatic
variability,38,42 analyzes need to appreciate that size,
economic, trade, and military disparities between
neighboring states also play an important part in
hydro-political cooperation.36 In cases of gradual
accretion most countries try to maintain the original
coupling of channel and boundary by conducting
periodic surveys. In cases of rapid avulsion, however,
some countries have chosen to maintain the original
delimitation, detaching the river from its political
construct. In this way, riparian neighbors have sought
to ‘fix’ their fluid border in an attempt to maintain a
permanent and static territorial frontier. For instance,
the Rio Grande on the US–Mexico border has been
subject to extensive canalisation since the 1911
Chamizal arbitration. Unfortunately, engineering a
stationary boundary in this way has led to significant
downstream environmental damage; particularly dur-
ing dry periods.16 The emergence of GPS technology
has enabled states to couple their boundary to a set
of coordinates. This method, adopted by the ICJ as
part of the Benin/Niger43 and Botswana/Namibia44
cases, aims to achieve geographical and legal clarity
by determining a line at a fixed time period. That
mentioned, even if neighboring states were to resolve
existing disputes over the delimitation of an IRB
section, the constant erosion and deposition of par-
ticles may still present inescapable legal and political
complications in the future.
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND RIVER
CHANNEL MORPHOLOGY
Stream morphology and channel stability are primar-
ily determined by the topography, channel material,
and flow of water and sediment from the surround-
ing basin.45 These, in turn, are determined by geology,
geomorphology, climate and, more recently, human
activity. Historical evidence and current understand-
ing of fluvial geomorphologic processes indicate that
rivers are highly responsive to changes in these pro-
cesses. As discussed earlier, river channels can move
gradually as occurs in meandering, or quickly in
response to flood-induced erosion or sediment depo-
sition, which can close and open channels in braided
and anastomosing systems. Climate also has an impact
on river basin drainage density, the total length of
the streams in a drainage basin area.46 The combined
length of a basin network represents ‘the signature
of climate’47 on the surrounding landscape and the
surface runoff environment. Therefore, understanding
the relationship between climate and drainage den-
sity is crucial to evaluate the sensitivity of hydrology
and fluvial processes to climate change. As is the case
with surface runoff and streamflow, the direction of
drainage density response is directly related to both
the sign of climatic change and the existing climatic
regime.47
Desert stream channels are extremely sensitive
to changes in hydrology, displaying rapid morpholog-
ical changes in response to slight climatic changes.48 A
decrease in flow may shrink the channel, and encour-
age bank sedimentation and vegetation growth, result-
ing in more stable patterns with low sinuosity49 (‘devi-
ation of actual channel path from expected theoret-
ical (straight) path’46). In other cases, severe aggra-
dation in dry regions can cause channels to broaden
and the bed to fill in.50 Over the last couple of
decades, the West African Sahel has experienced a
run of droughts contributing to shrinkage of Lake
Chad’s surface area by 95% over 35 years.51 Given
that this water body straddles the borders of Nige-
ria, Chad, and Cameroon, any change in lake lev-
els is likely to alter vital water resources for the
respective nations, and potentially, encourage dis-
putes over sovereignty.52 Extreme rainfall events in
arid environments may permanently change the mor-
phology of alluvial channels.53 Detailed review of a
112-year record of a river in Arizona showed large
floods caused its channel to deepen and migrate up to
1.6 km.54 Some present day canyons, which were orig-
inally bedrock channels, were formed by the power of
mega-floods thousands of years ago.55
Water and sediment inputs are controlled not
only by climatic drivers, but also human activity,
either directly through channel modification (e.g., dam
construction, embankments) or indirectly through
water abstraction and land use change.49 Due to
pervasive human interference, indirect responses to
climate change will be highly nonlinear, typified
by various feedbacks relating to different variables
involving lead and lag periods of time.56 Anthro-
pogenic climate change impacts on river channel
systems result from the direct effects of rising tem-
peratures and CO2 concentrations, and indirect influ-
ences through the intensification of the global hydro-
logical cycle, leading to changes in precipitation
patterns, evapotranspiration rates and soil moisture.57
Although the detail of precipitation change remains
uncertain, an intensified hydrological cycle will bring
greater variability; as water vapor and the holding
capacity of the atmosphere increases, storm events will
be supplied with more moisture, even in places where
mean precipitation is declining.58 A recent assessment
of global flood risk for the end of this century using
multimodel scenarios found large increases in flood
frequency in south-east Asia, peninsular India, east-
ern Africa, and the northern half of the Andes.7 At
the same time, droughts will become more severe and
widespread within the next 30–90 years, particularly
in some of the world’s most densely populated regions
(Europe, the eastern United States, southeast Asia and
Brazil).59
Whether attributed to human or natural
causes, changes in fluvial processes will affect chan-
nel morphology.45 These processes are likely to
involve disturbances in the balance between river
sediment transport and deposition in rivers, wet-
lands, flood plains, and coastal areas. The extent of
stream response often depends on drainage basin
characteristics.45,46,51 For instance, river channels that
flow over resistant bedrock and basins with extensive
lake or glacial storage capacity tend to be more stable;
whereas rivers with fine-grained alluvial beds and
limited storage tend to be particularly sensitive to
changes in flow regimes.45
River channel responses to climate variabil-
ity and future climatic changes are, however, highly
uncertain.49 In humid regions, an increase in stream-
flow could potentially widen or deepen channels as
a result of increased erosional rates.45 Furthermore,
any surge in streamflow is likely to result in higher
sinuosity and quickened channel migration, possibly
leading to braided patterns. Moreover, if large floods
increase in intensity, channel features may suddenly
change resulting in chronic instability, especially if
floods become more frequent.45 Chowdhury60 found
that the Brahmaputra–Jamuna River has been widen-
ing since the early 1970s at an average rate of 130m
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per year.61 Despite uncertainty regarding the effect of
future changes in streamflows and sediment, the river’s
future is a concern given relations between India and
Bangladesh.60
The management challenge of Earth surface sys-
tem response to climate change has been underesti-
mated by policymakers and has brought calls for more
monitoring and modeling of these dynamic systems.1
Very large increases in streamflow, unless mitigated by
management, are likely to alter channel patterns and
reductions could shift flow regimes, from perennial
through ephemeral, to episodic and even permanently
dry. Thresholds in annual precipitation governing
perennial runoff have been identified with the hypoth-
esis that regions with highly variable rainfall regimes
will exhibit nonlinear responses of drainage patterns,
in relation to changes in precipitation.20 In the con-
text of modeling impacts of environmental change on
fluvial systems two main approaches exist, each with
many model types; flow models which simulate fluxes
of water through a catchment, and geomorpholog-
ical models which simulate change in landforms.62
The former include flood inundation models, which
have been used widely to simulate climate change
impacts on flood risk, however, these models do not
capture sediment movement and geomorphological
change which severely limits their application for such
purposes. The coupling of flood inundation models
with landscape evolution models (LEM) has been sug-
gested to provide a more viable option.62 LEMs are
physically based process models that simulate relevant
processes for landscape formation across complete
river catchments from decades to millennia. Contin-
gency, the particulars of time and space, is known to be
highly important, as timing, sequence and initial con-
ditions strongly influence outcomes.63 Palaeo-channel
reconstruction has been used to infer past environmen-
tal conditions, however, there are limitations to this
approach; response is often spatially and temporally
variable throughout the catchment.62 In total, these
gaps in understanding, observations, and modeling
capacity mean that current projections of future runoff
patterns can only be used to infer possible implications
for river channel systems.
EXPLORATORY RISK ASSESSMENT:
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Background
In this section, we present a preliminary approach to
assessing the potential challenge climate change repre-
sents for physical and socio-political risks associated
with IRBs. We chose Southern Africa as it exemplifies
a fusion of contributory factors leading to poten-
tial high risk; worsening physical and socioeconomic
water scarcity18,64 which constrains economic growth
and development,65 transboundary and regional allo-
cation pressures,66 and highly variable climate and
streamflows64,67 that will likely become drier and
more variable in the future.6,18 Climate model exper-
iments also indicate that Southern Africa could expe-
rience increases in daily rainfall and rainfall extremes
due to changes in sea surface temperature and atmo-
spheric circulation in the South Atlantic.68 These chal-
lenges are exacerbated by political, institutional, and
economic factors, including limited management and
regulatory capacity, and highly inequitable access to
reliable potable water.31 Moreover, what Southern
Africa lacks in water resources it makes up for in
IRBs and these colonial constructs have already exac-
erbated existing tension between neighbors and, in
some cases, led to IRB-related disputes,64 which could
be worsened by changing climatic and socioeconomic
pressures.14
Southern Africa is defined here as all mainland
member states of the South African Development
Community (SADC). This comprises the republics of
Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; the United
Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic
of Congo; together with the kingdoms of Lesotho
and Swaziland.31 A variety of ecosystems exist within
these states and environmental systems can be highly
dynamic, experiencing dramatic transformations as a
result of seasonal floods and decadal fluctuations in
precipitation. Water bodies not withstanding, rivers
within the 12 SADC states contribute to 19 of the
26 international boundaries in the region.69 IRBs are
distributed throughout the region and vary greatly in
length and significance (Figure 1).
Much of Southern Africa has a semi-arid rain-
fall regime (400–1000mm) with high multiyear rain-
fall variability. Regional streamflows are unevenly dis-
tributed and display high levels of variability across a
range of spatial and temporal scales.67,70 High poten-
tial evapotranspiration results in exceptionally low
conversion of rainfall to runoff (e.g., 5.1% in the
Orange and Limpopo71). Extensive regions within
Africa regularly experience prolonged severe droughts
that are often followed by intense rainfall events.64 For
instance, continuous flows in Namibia and Botswana
are particularly scarce, both relying on supplies from
either small, ephemeral streams that only flow after
heavy rainfall events, or perennial rivers that are
sourced outside their borders.64 The Caprivi region
of Namibia has recently experienced a renewal of
severe flooding after a dry period during the 1990s.72
Volume 5, November/December 2014 © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 839
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(a) (b)
(c)
FIGURE 1 | (a–c): International River Boundaries in Southern Africa (shown in dark blue lines) (outlines derived from the IRBD; Data accessed
from https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/irbd/), watercourses and lakes (shown in light blue), remaining International Political Boundaries (shown in
green lines) and % change in mean annual runoff (MAR) for the 2080s using a global hydrological model driven with the Coupled Model
Intercomparison Project (CMIP3) multimodel scenarios (results obtained from Fung et al.56), for a dry case (driest 10 percentile), average (median),
and wet case (wettest 90 percentile) (Figure 1(a–c), respectively). Red numbers in Figure 1(a) can be cross-referenced with Table 1, and red boxes in
Figure 1(b) indicate two potential hotspots of IRB risk identiﬁed during our analysis (LO= Lower Orange, L–C= Linyanti–Chobe).
In 2009, the upper Zambezi flooded parts of Zambia
and Namibia, replenishing Lake Liambezi, which had
almost dried out in the 1990s.72
Climate change has the capacity to modify
boundary environments in Southern Africa by a num-
ber of routes. It may intensify the hydrological cycle
bringing greater variability to flood and drought
events, creating increasingly unstable fluvial environ-
ments. It may also lengthen seasonal droughts, which
could turn perennial rivers into ephemeral streams,
setting it into a negative cycle of change, the results
being diminished drainage capacity. It is likely to be
changes in the intensity and timing of events that
cause problems, as more high intensity rainfall leads to
flooding in basins with low storage capacity.73 Strong
interactions exist between ecological and hydrolog-
ical processes in semi-arid systems. Vegetation dis-
plays marked seasonal and interannual fluctuations
associated with moisture availability and patches
can obstruct and retain runoff leading to positive
feedbacks and patch growth.74 The distribution of
evergreen and deciduous vegetation is a potential con-
tributory factor, along with rainfall variability, to
greater streamflow variability in arid and temperate
840 © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Volume 5, November/December 2014
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TABLE 1 Qualitative Risk Proﬁle of IRBs in Southern Africa in Relation to Environmental and Political Factors Using Trafﬁc Light Shading as
Indicative Risk
River (Boundary) Basin
Median
Projections
of MAR >+_* 20%
(2080s)
Evidence of
Dispute
History or
Existing
Tensions
Sufﬁcient
Published
Literature
for Further
Analysis? Aggregate Risk
1 Caledon (Lesotho–South Africa) Orange LOW
2* Linyanti/Chobe (Botswana–Namibia) Zambezi Yes HIGH
3 Gairezi/Jora (Mozambique–Zimbabwe) Zambezi LOW
4 Kasai (Angola–DR Congo) Congo LOW
5 Kunene (Angola–Namibia) Kunene LOW
6 Cuando (Angola–Zambia) Zambezi POTENTIAL (climate)
7 Cuango (Angola–DR Congo) Congo LOW
8 Limpopo (Botswana–South Africa) Limpopo LOW
9 Limpopo (South Africa–Zimbabwe) Limpopo LOW
10 Luapula (DR Congo–Zambia) Congo LOW
11 Mkumvaru (Mozambique–Zimbabwe) Zambezi LOW
12 Molopo (Botswana–South Africa) Orange POTENTIAL (climate)
13 Nossob (Botswana–South Africa) Orange POTENTIAL (climate)
14 Okavango (Angola–Namibia) Okavango No HIGH
15* Orange (Namibia–South Africa) Orange Yes HIGH
16 Ramaquabane (Botswana–Zimbabwe) Limpopo LOW
17 Ruo (Malawi–Mozambique) Zambezi LOW
18 Ruvuma (Mozambique–Tanzania) Ruvuma LOW
19 Songwe and L. Malawi (Malawi–Tanzania) Zambezi
— —
— —
— —
— —
—
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
—
—
— —
— —
— —
— — LOW
20 Zambezi (Namibia–Zambia) Zambezi No HIGH
21 Zambezi (Zambia–Zimbabwe) Zambezi No HIGH
Low=Green, Moderate=Yellow, and High=Red. IRBs with low future climate risk to changes in runoff are displayed in green; IRBs with high climate risk to
changes in runoff but no evidence of dispute history or existing tensions are considered potentially at risk and are displayed in yellow; IRBs with high aggregate
risk (both climate and political risk) are displayed in red. Risk assessment is sequential, if IRBs did not meet the first criteria [>±20%mean annual runoff (MAR)
change for the 2080s] they were dropped from the analysis (boxes represented with —). Basins with high aggregate risk and sufficient published literature to
allow further contextual analysis are indicated with an *: two out of the five high risk basins fulfilled these criteria.
Southern Africa than is found for other continents
with similar climatic zones.67
Methodology
We present a qualitative risk profile of IRBs in South-
ern Africa in relation to climatic and political fac-
tors to illustrate how research on this issue could
be developed. The approach infers categories of risk
for specific IRB sections using insights from litera-
ture review (i.e., evidence of dispute history or exist-
ing tensions that may lead to future conflicts, derived
fromAshton64; representing political risk) and median
projections of mean annual runoff (MAR, represent-
ing climatic risk). Simulated changes in MAR were
obtained for the 2080s (Figure 1), derived from a
1∘ resolution global hydrological model driven with
a multimodel ensemble of 22 global climate mod-
els from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project
(CMIP3) (results from Fung et al.75), for a dry case
(driest 10 percentile), median and wet case (wettest
90 percentile). The global hydrological model has
been widely used for climate impact studies and per-
forms well across a range of river basins, including the
Orange in Southern Africa.75–77
IRBs were initially assessed based on the pro-
jected severity of changes in upstreamMAR, by 2080.
Table 1 summarizes the sequential approach in the
form of a ‘traffic light’ assessment. IRBs were dis-
counted if median change in upstream runoff was less
than ±20% of the baseline, with 20% defined as a
threshold considered large enough to lead to channel
Volume 5, November/December 2014 © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 841
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disruption (Schewe et al.6 used a threshold of 20% as
an indicator for severe decrease in discharge); remain-
ing IRBs were eliminated if there was no evidence of
dispute history or existing tensions in the boundary
region (assessed through detailed web searches and lit-
erature review). The final step was to exclude the bor-
der if it was not represented in the literature because
for these initial purposes we wanted to consider sit-
uations where enough background existed to allow
development of a narrative to contextualize the risk
indicators. This final criterion was chosen to enable
a more focused approach to analyzing the individ-
ual boundary contexts, and therefore, a full under-
standing of all of the IRBs exposed to climate risk
in the region would require further study. It is possi-
ble we have excluded cases where much greater risk
exists, but for which we were unable to find back-
ground information. A traffic light shading scheme
was used to represent indicative risk (Low=Green,
Moderate=Yellow, and High=Red). In summary, the
risk assessment was sequential, if IRBs did not meet
the first criteria (>±20% change in upstream MAR)
they were dropped from the analysis (13 out of 21),
and likewise for the second criteria (no history of
disputes, 3 out of 8). Boundaries and corresponding
upstream basins with High Aggregate Risk and suf-
ficient published literature were then considered for
further contextual analysis (two out of the remaining
five IRBs fulfilled these criteria) (Table 1).
Results
Climate model results suggest the region will become
warmer and most project drier conditions.75 Figure 1
shows simulated changes in runoff for the 2080s.
The dry case (Figure 1a) suggests a decline in runoff
(compared with the 1961–1990 period) of over 20%
across most of the region by 2080. Furthermore,
a predominant northeast to southwest gradient of
change in runoff occurs, from a 0–20% reduction in
the Rovuma Basin to as much as 80% along the Lower
Orange River. The median case shows a decrease in
runoff across most of the region by 2080 (Figure 1b).
Reductions of over 20% extend northeast as far as the
Okavango Basin, while increases in runoff spread west
across the Congo Basin and as far south as the Lower
Zambezi. Lastly, the wet case projects increasing
runoff across most of the region by 2080 (Figure 1c).
The Rift valley, and middle course of the Orange Basin
are projected to experience the most pronounced wet-
ting (60–140% increase in places), while decreases in
runoff still appear along the SouthMozambique Coast
(–0–20%) and Western Cape (–20–40%). Analysis
of scenarios from the recent CMIP-5 climate model
experiments presented in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment
Report show broadly similar patterns of change in
precipitation.78 An ensemble of global hydrological
models driven by five scenarios from the CMIP-5
process shows for the multimodel mean reductions
in annual discharge from 0% to 50% across much
of Southern Africa, excluding Southwest Botswana.6
The range in results due to differences between climate
model scenarios (see supporting information in Figure
S2 of Ref 6) appears broadly consistent with results
shown here in Figure 1. In addition, they find global
hydrological model differences also contribute signif-
icantly to the spread in relative discharge changes in
much of Southern Africa.6 These results indicate that
without adaptation certain boundary regions within
Southern Africa could experience marked changes in
river channel systems as a consequence of changes
in surface runoff. The changes in Figure 1 should be
seen as indicative, as they represent gridded runoff,
not accumulated streamflow, derived from just one
global hydrological model.
Two IRB sections met our risk assessment
criteria: the lower section of the Orange Basin
(Namibia–South Africa) and flowing into the Zam-
bezi Basin, the Linyanti–Chobe section of the Cuando
tributary (the southern edge of the Caprivi Strip
between Namibia and Botswana). They display traits
of both biophysical and socio-political risk factors, but
unlike other IRBs had been covered in the literature.
The characteristics of these two potential hotspots of
IRB risk are explained in Figure 2. The Lower Orange
is clearly vulnerable to climate change given its geo-
graphical configuration, extreme climatic regime,79
looming basin closure, and disputed delineation,80
although, due to heavy upstream regulation, man-
agement responses will strongly determine future
outcomes.31 Along the Linyanti–Chobe section of
boundary, channel morphology is extremely dynamic;
flow direction and the shape and position of channels
can change suddenly, especially after extreme flood
events.72,81 Given there is a history of conflict over
channel islands,44 basin states may start to view the
role of this IRB differently. The importance of key
factors such as perceptions of water stress and his-
torical and political context will characterize the risk
at specific IRBs. For instance, the uncoupling (i.e.,
when two countries continue to perceive a boundary
as fixed despite shifts in channel morphology) of the
Linyanti–Chobe River (as occurred in 1999 after an
ICJ judgement44) demonstrates preference toward
land stability over unreliable channels. In the future,
states may undertake hard engineering measures to
secure access to increasingly scarce water resources,
and simultaneously ‘fix’ their boundary. This is
of concern, given the high potential for knock-on
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environmental and social effects downstream. In
an ideal world, IRB confrontation would only be
fully mitigated by reconciliation and continual dialog
between governments and local communities.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This review and exploratory analysis aims to high-
light an issue of potential concern, across physical
and socio-political domains, which has received very
little attention. Future climate change is unlikely to
be a major issue in all instances of IRBs or other
dynamic physical border settings; many river chan-
nels are stable, naturally or through management, the
environmental response to changes in climate may be
relatively manageable or countries may already have
agreements to deal effectively with shifts in bound-
ary conditions when they occur. However, this will not
always be the case and it would therefore be prudent
to consider the coincidence of potential risk factors in
order to identify hotspot situations where further anal-
ysis could be beneficial. Below we outline several areas
of further action required to assess fully the scale and
significance of the problem.
We stress the need to address recognized gaps in
understanding of monitoring, modeling, and manag-
ing the impacts of climate change on river channel
response and other Earth surface systems.49 A key
challenge is that fluvial systems exhibit chaotic and
nonlinear behavior, such that some studies question
whether it is even possible to determine a response
to external forcings within the same network.82
They suggest the true value of models is not in pre-
cise predictions but rather what is likely to happen, or
what direction a system might take after an external
forcing. Given the extent of IRBs globally, establishing
criteria for defining channel stability ratings and iden-
tifying river channel systems that demonstrate natu-
ral sensitivity could help infer hotspots of boundary
physical vulnerability.
From the standpoint of international law,
because each change in river morphology possesses
its own particular character, establishing a set of legal
principles that distinguish between levels of change
has proven to be a major challenge.33 Globally, terri-
torial and boundary issues have not been high on the
list of priorities for transboundary water institutions83
and most boundary treaties fail to include a contin-
gency for when the watercourse begins to shift away
from a set of coordinates. In these instances, treaties
should include regular appraisals of the coordinates
to ensure accuracy and lessen ambiguity. Boundary
treaties should also be updated to integrate with water
treaties and include periodic surveys and contingencies
for future channel change, while simultaneously dele-
gating responsibility to those states directly involved.
Conflict resolution mechanisms have been recognized
as vital components of water treaties,84,85 and four
main types have been identified in the literature. These
span from informal soft law (e.g., negotiation and
mediation) to more formal measures (e.g., arbitra-
tion and adjudication),86 however many treaties are
without such facilities.87 Where diplomatic incidents
have arisen, Article 33 of the UN Charter obliges all
states to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner.
The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses also represents an important con-
flict prevention mechanism through its framework of
principles and rules on international rivers.
Transboundary databases of treaties and water
events held by the Program in Water Conflict Man-
agement and Transformation (e.g., Yoffe et al.88)
and drawing from other river basin vulnerability
assessments,89 could provide a useful basis for char-
acterizing the socio-political aspects of risk. Coupled
with a comprehensive assessment of physical risks
for IRBs and other unstable boundaries this would
form a benchmarking exercise to identify hotspot
sites deserving further study. We have presented an
exploratory example of such an assessment for South-
ern Africa, a hotspot region that exemplifies the
challenges arising from water insecurity. This identi-
fied the Lower Orange (Namibia–South Africa) and
Linyanti–Chobe (Namibia–Botswana) sections as situ-
ations where aggregate risk (projected change inMAR
and history of disputes or tension) is high and there-
fore deserving more detailed analysis.
As a resource, river water serves domestic, indus-
trial and recreational users, and supplies communities
with fish and the potential to produce energy. On the
other hand, these naturally variable systems represent
a constant threat from flooding and erosion. Water-
courses serve as essential arteries, linking states and
transporting communities, commodities and cultures
across borders. River channels also constitute bound-
aries between neighboring states. Climate change is
expected to intensify the hydrological cycle bringing
greater variability to flood and drought events. Geo-
morphological studies suggest that changes in fluvial
processes, brought on by changes in flow and sedi-
ment, could reshape river channel systems. Climate
change could therefore exacerbate underlying weak-
nesses and in some cases dramatically alter politi-
cal and social landscapes at boundaries located along
watercourses and other unstable features, such as ice
cover and lakes; the very boundaries designed to mit-
igate conflict now have the potential to provoke it.
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NOTES
a Although we make reference to other surface sys-
tems (lakes, glaciers, small island states) the term
‘watercourse’ in this case, is used as a general term
for ‘river’, and while the 1997 UN definition includes
groundwater, our analysis is restricted to surface
water.
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